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CONTEXTUAL REGULATION OF INDECENCY:
A HAPPY MEDIUM FOR CABLE TELEVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Cable television has expanded rapidly over the past decade.1 Currently,
over forty-seven percent2 of all American households subscribe to cable TV3
and this figure is expected to almost double by 1990 as the medium's tech-
nology advances. 4 This expansion is attributable to the wide variety of pro-
grams offered by cablecast,5 including several channels for "adults only,"
which show sexually explicit material.6 Because of its diverse entertainment
potential, cable television has been hailed as a savior from the bland, rat-
ings-oriented major network programming. 7 Indeed, media authorities have
lauded cable television as the medium which will revolutionize American
communications.' However, because of regulations introduced by several
federal, state, and private organizations, society has not yet realized the full
1. For the purposes of this note "cable television" is subscriber or pay television that
requires the user to pay a fee before desired programming is received. Cable television is re-
ceived into the viewer's home via a wire that runs directly from a cable franchise.
2. Multichannel News, Sept. 1, 1986, at 14. This represents an increase from 45.7
percent as of September I, 1985. According to data obtained from A.C. Nielson Co., cable is
currently found in more than 41.2 million homes. There are 85.9 million U.S. TV homes.
California had the three highest areas of penetration:
A, San Angelo, 88.3 percent
B. Palm Springs, 85.3 percent
C. Santa Barbara, 84.9 percent
Id.
3. For the purposes of this note "cable TV," "cable television," "cablecast," and
"cable" are all synonymous.
4. For a discussion of the extent to which cable is expected to become a part of the
American way of life, see Robbins, Indecency On Cable Television - A Barren Battleground
For Regulation of Programming Content, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 417, 418 (1984).
5. Transmission via cablecast is received through wires which run from the operator's
station to subscriber's home. Cablecast is to be distinguished from broadcast whereby recep-
tion occurs through the airwaves.
6. Sexually explicit material shows extensive nudity, including the genital areas of the
body, or sexual intercourse where a sexual act is explicitly shown.
7. See Note, Obscenity, Cable Television and the First Amendment: Will FCC Regu-
lation Impair The Marketplace of Ideas?, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 965 (1983) for the proposition
that cable TV will provide an alternative to what is currently programmed on the three major
networks.
8. For examples of how cable will revolutionize American communications see Com-
ment, FCC Content Regulation of Cable Pay-Television: The Threat of Pacifica, 9 Cum. L.
REV. 811 (1979).
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potential of cable TV as a new communications media.9
Cable television's success as a new media depends on the opposition it
encounters from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 10 and
other regulatory agencies. Consequently, representatives of the cable indus-
try and first amendment advocates vigorously oppose regulation. These ad-
vocates analogize cable TV to the print media, arguing that cable is pro-
tected by the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and its
theme of promoting an "unfettered marketplace of ideas."" Contrary to
this position, advocates of regulation equate cable television with the broad-
cast media,'" demanding stringent regulation because cable is uniquely per-
vasive in its extension into the privacy of the home and in its unique acces-
sibility to children.13 Case law illustrates that individual freedom of speech
has a long history of conflict with the right to privacy of others;' 4 the new-
9. See Note, supra note 7, at 966 (potential of cable television may go unrealized
because of regulatory efforts of federal, state and private agencies).
10. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.S. § 521 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4655 [hereinafter Policy Act], and its predecessor The Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974), confer jurisdiction over
the regulation of cable television upon the FCC.
I1. The analogy to the newsprint media is the strongest part of most arguments as-
serted against the regulation of cable. Where it can be shown that cable and newsprint are
similar in their editorial function, content, and non-pervasive entry into the home, the first
amendment standards applied to newsprint should also be applied to cable. See, e.g., G. SHA-
PIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, "CABLESPEECH": THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PRO-
TECTION (1983); Hofbauer, "Cableporn" and the First Amendment: Perspectives On Content
Regulation of Cable Television, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 159-162 (1983); McFadden, Inviting The
Pig To The Parlor: The Case Against The Regulation of Indecency and Obscenity On Cable
Television, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 317, 323 (1984); Note, Cable Television and Content
Regulation: The FCC, First Amendment and The Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV.
133 (1976).
12. Where it can be shown cablecast and broadcast are both uniquely intrusive into the
homes of unwilling viewers and uniquely accessible to children, the argument is that the first
amendment standards which allow the FCC to regulate broadcast should likewise permit the
FCC to regulate cablecast. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Pro-
grams: The New Morality Meets The New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606 (1983); Riggs,
Indecency On The Cable: Can It be Regulated?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 269 (1984); Note, Indecent
Programming On Cable Television and The First Amendment, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 254,
255 (1983); Note, supra note 7, at 965.
13. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulation of broadcast
upheld since broadcast is uniquely pervasive in its extension into the home and is uniquely
accessible to children).
14. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (reversing convic-
tion for showing movie which contained nudity and which was visible from a public place);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction for wearing a jacket containing
the words "Fuck the Draft" in a public place and recognizing freedom of speech often conflicts
with the right to privacy).
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est struggle has arisen in the area of indecency 5 on cable television.' 6
Resolution of this issue requires an analysis of governmental regulation
of indecency on cable television. Initially, such an analysis necessitates an
examination of the history of cable TV and the various federal regulatory
schemes. An examination of the current standards by which material is
deemed obscene or indecent will further illuminate the first amendment
concerns. Resolution of the issue also requires an appreciation for the dif-
ferences between cablecast and broadcast as well as an appreciation for the
similarities between cablecast and the newsprint media. Upon such an anal-
ysis, it will be asserted that cable regulation, in its current form, is uncon-
stitutional. Alternatively, a contextual regulation approach will be pro-
posed. Under a contextual regulation approach, indecent cable
programming could be transmitted and received without forcing those not
desiring to view such material to sacrifice programming on other cable
channels.
The issue examined in this note is whether government has a substan-
tial interest in regulating cable television in light of the argument that cable
is so analogous to the newsprint media that similar first amendment protec-
tion is required. A brief overview of the cable television medium and of
governmental efforts to regulate it provides the starting point for the resolu-
tion of this issue.
II. OVERVIEW OF CABLE TELEVISION AND CURRENT REGULATIONS
Cable television initially developed'17 as a method of delivering broad-
cast signals to rural homes which could not receive such signals by conven-
tional methods.' 8 Today, however, cable systems have multichannel capac-
ity'9 and are used both as "rural antennas" and as subscription television,
15. "Indecency" for the purposes of this note is sexually explicit material which does
not rise to the level of obscenity as defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see
infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
16. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 419 for the proposition that indecency on cable tele-
vision appears to be the latest class of free speech to conflict with the right to privacy.
17. The first system, a community antenna system, was constructed in Lansford, Penn-
sylvania, by the Jerrold Electronic Corporation in 1950 and provided only three amplified sig-
nals to its subscribers. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 102, at 1-6 (Rev. ed. 1981); R.
LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL 67 (1973). See also
Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85-88 (1981) for a discussion
of the background and development of cable television.
18. Since cable television signals are received through a coaxial cable, there is little
distortion as with broadcast signals which often have to compete for space on the electromag-
netic spectrum. See Comment, supra note 8, at 812.
19. Improvements in cable technology have increased channel capacity of single sys-
tems to as many as 108 separate programming channels. M. HAMBURG, supra note 17, at 1-4.
For a complete discussion of the technological workings of cable systems, see C. WOODARD,
1986]
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which for a fee provides the consumer with a wider range of programs than
network television.2" Cablecast's most recent innovation concerns cable pay-
television. 21 Cable pay-television provides programs for a fee like subscrip-
tion television, but uses cable rather than broadcast transmission.22 Since
this type of cable TV does not rely on the electromagnetic spectrum, it is
not affected by the limited capacity of the airwaves as is conventional
television.
In some ways cable television may be called a revolutionary medium.
2 3
For example, cable TV provides near perfect reception and alleviates
crowding of the electromagnetic spectrum.24 So, unlike broadcasting, there
seem to be little or no technical limitations on the potential number of
channels available in a given locale. 25 In fact, current technology could in-
crease capacity to transmit over 80 channels through a single cable.26
Should all channels on a given cable be in use, technologically there is no
reason why another cable could not be installed.2 7 Additionally, foreseeable
future developments will make cable's channel capacity almost infinite as
well as economically feasible.2 8 The biggest advantage of cable, however,
CABLE TELEVISION: ACQUISITION AND OPERATION OF CATV SYSTEMS 1-14 (1974).
20. First run movies and athletic events are broadcast on conventional TV channels
using its equipment; however, the audio and visual signals are purposely distorted. To correct
the image and receive the program, subscribers lease special decoding devices. See BLOCK,
OVER THE AIR PAY-TV: FOR WHOM WILL IT PAY? 6-8 (1974).
21. Note, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and Content Regulation of
Cable Television, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 779-783 (1984-85). Cable's two-way capacity is an-
other recent technological advancement. Two-way capacity involves the use of a home com-
puter terminal for such activities as banking and shopping. This separate cable service is called
"videotext." Id. See also Stern, Krasnow, & Senkowksi, The New Video Marketplace and the
Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. L. REV. 529, 532-62 (1983) for a
discussion of recent video technological innovations.
22. Subscribers to cable pay-TV are drawn from a pool of individuals already con-
nected to the parent cable system. These people pay fees on a per-program or per-channel
basis and lease decoding devices to insure clear reception. See R. ADLER & S. BAER, THE
ELECTRONIC Box OFFICE: HUMANITIES AND ARTS ON THE CABLE 30-46 (1974).
23. See Note, supra note I1, at 134-137 (cable's cost, simplicity and "talk back" ca-
pacity could turn the family television into a multifunctional societal tool).
24. The electromagnetic spectrum provides only a limited spectrum space suitable for
broadcasting. This space, if divided randomly, may fall too close together and cancel each
other out. Thus, available frequencies are limited. See Sloan Commission On Cable Communi-
cations, On The Cable.- The Television Of Abundance 6-22 (1971) [hereinafter Sloan
Commission].
25. See Comment, supra note 8, at 813 (major advantage over broadcasting).
26. Sloan Commission, supra note 24, at 37.
27. There is little physical space required and since the installation costs are minimal,
more coaxial cables could be installed than could feasibly be used. See Comment, supra note
8, at 813.
28. Communications systems in various stages of development, such as laser and wave
guide systems can, through a single cable, supply tens of thousands of channels. See, e.g.,
Time, April 12, 1971, at 59.
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may be its potential for program diversity and innovative channel use.
In the highly competitive video market," diversity and innovation ap-
pear very attractive to consumers. The various programs available to local
cable operators include news, sports, and movies, as well as adult entertain-
ment, educational, and public interest programs.30 Such variety allows the
cable operator to market specific programs to small viewing audiences. 3'
For example, entire channels can be devoted to health care information or
market reports.3 2 The more diverse a cable system's programming becomes,
the more subscribers it is likely to attract; the more subscribers it attracts,
the more funds the system will have with which to expand.3 3 Thus, cable's
growth and ultimate success depend on its number of subscribers. Absent
mass subscriptions, cable's success seems improbable. Since mass subscrip-
tion depends on cable's diverse programming, specialized programming
aimed at limited segments of a community is extremely important." How-
ever, current regulatory efforts effectively suppress this specialized
programming.
Cable systems are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of federal,
state, and local authorities as well as acts of Congress and the efforts of
private organizations." The principal source of governmental regulation is
the FCC.36 Generally, FCC control over cablecast is ancillary to that
agency's regulation of broadcasting. Pursuant to the Communications Act
of 1934, the FCC may regulate broadcast to promote the efficient develop-
ment of a national communications network." Until very recently, FCC
29. The video market in which cable TV competes also includes: multi-point distribu-
tion service (MDS), over-the-air broadcasting (radio and television), satellite master antennas
(SMATV) and video cassettes, discs, and movie theaters. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at
9-10.
30. See Hofbauer, supra note 11, at 145 for other programming typically offered by
cable operators.
31. See Note, supra note 23, at 137 (large number of channels available could provide
specialized programming to limited segments of the community since the cost of each channel
is minimal).
32. Sloan Commission, supra note 24, at 97-114.
33. Id. at 38-39 for proposition that cable's income is ultimately tied to its subscriber
base.
34. The revenue from such specialized programming is not only used to continue ser-
vices for that group, but is also used for expansion. Thus, this specialized programming is
important to cable's financial survival. See Note, supra note 23, at 137.
35. This note does not deal with regulation of cable retransmission. For a discussion of
the problems associated with regulation of this function, see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMU-
NICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., Cable Television: Promise Versus Regulatory Performance 33-54 (Subcomm. Print
1976).
36. For a summary of events which led up to the first FCC cable regulation, see United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-67 (1968).
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). See also Southwestern Cable, 392
1986]
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regulation over cable was characterized by frequent reversal of policy.
These policy changes resulted from the protection of radio and conventional
television broadcast (at the expense of cable TV) and from ill-fated efforts
to design cablecast according to preconceived notions.3 8
Originally, the FCC disclaimed jurisdiction over cable systems3" and
only gradually asserted authority over some types of systems."' By the late
1960's, the FCC gained such extensive control that it seemed to rule the
cable medium with an iron fist.41 Before long, though, a process of regula-
tory retrenchment set in, and by the mid 1970's, the FCC began to deregu-
late and lessen its stranglehold on cable television . 2 The courts encouraged
this position and impressed upon the FCC that it was the protector of the
public's right to receive information, not the "guardian angel" of
broadcasting.' 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
FCC policy of deregulation. In Malrite T.V. v. FCC," the court stated that
deregulation did not threaten the broadcast industry as the FCC had previ-
ously contended.45 Further, the court concluded that cable television might
be the best possibility for special interest programming in the video commu-
nications market.4" Although FCC regulation of cable TV is not as exten-
sive as it previously had been, the effect of the current FCC position con-
cerning the regulation of indecency on cablecast remains to be seen.
Recently, Congress and private organizations have seemingly advo-
cated deregulation of some aspects of cablecast while stubbornly insisting
on regulation in other areas. For example, Congress codified the current
regulatory approach in The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the
"Policy Act"). 7 One Congressional purpose behind this statute is to insure
U.S. at 157 (FCC's authority to regulate cable under the Communications Act where cable
operator sought to import Los Angles television signals to a San Diego cable system upheld).
38. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note I1, at 15 (cable viewed as a threat to broadcast and
the national communications network which is provided at no direct cost to the viewer).
39. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958), recon. denied, Report
And Order in Docket No. 12443, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959) (first case where FCC declined to
extend its authority over communications to cablecast).
40. Second Report And Order in Docket Nos. 14895, 15233 and 15971, 2 F.C.C. 2d
725 (1966) (terrestrial microwave systems first, all microwave systems second, then all distant
carriage systems, finally all origination program systems).
41. The FCC was imposing regulations on cable television almost at will. See G. SHA-
PIRO, supra note 11, at 16.
42. This was the result of a change in the regulatory philosophy of the FCC. Id. at 17.
43. See Note, supra note 23, at 139 (FCC charged with protection of public not of
specific media).
44. 652 F.2d 1140 (1981).
45. Id. at 1151.
46. Id.
47. See Policy Act, supra note 10, 47 U.S.C.S. §§ 521(1)-(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
[Vol. 21
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that cable systems provide the widest possible diversity of information ser-
vices and sources to the public consistent with the first amendment." Thus,
the Policy Act's stated purpose appears to support cable's specialized pro-
gramming, such as entertainment for adults, although subsequent sections
specifically restrict these programs. 9
A private organization, Morality In Media, Inc.,50 has undertaken the
most extensive non-governmental crusade in favor of cable television regula-
tion.51 This organization lobbies primarily for the regulation of obscene or
indecent programming on cablecast and warns the government that pornog-
raphy will be "downstairs instead of downtown" unless control over cable is
asserted. 52 In fact, under a model ordinance drafted by Morality In Media,
the distribution of indecent material by cable franchising authorities would
constitute a misdemeanor.53 It is doubtful, however, that this proposed ordi-
1985). The Policy Act's stated purposes include: to establish a national policy concerning
cable; to set up franchise procedures; to establish guidelines for federal, state, and local regula-
tions of cable; to modify franchise renewal procedures and, to minimize unnecessary regula-
tion that imposes an undue economic burden on cable systems. Id.
48. Policy Act, supra note 10, at 4656.
49. See, e.g., Policy Act, supra note 10, § 612(h) which prohibits programming that is
"obscene, or in conflict with community standards because it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, inde-
cent, or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution." Id.
50. Morality In Media, Inc., is one of the most outspoken proponents of cable content
regulation. Led by its president, Father Morton Hill, this organization is engaged in a nation-
wide campaign designed to alert communities to the threat of pornography in the home. See
Bednarek, Priest Decries Cable TV Porn, Milwaukee Sentinel, Oct. 30, 1985.
51. Tell, Cable TV's Sex Problem, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 1982, at
28. (group made cableporn its "Target of the Month" and has been fairly successful in draw-
ing attention to pornography problem).
52. See Hofbauer, supra note II, at 141 (pornography will be downstairs instead of
downtown unless a stand is taken now at state and local levels).
53. The Morality In Media Model Ordinance provides:
Section I
(a) No person (including franchisee) shall by means of a cable television system,
knowingly distribute by wire or cable to its subscribers indecent material or
knowingly provide such material for distribution.
(b) "Person" shall include individuals, partnerships, associations or corporations.
(c) "Distribute" shall mean send, transmit or retransmit or otherwise pass through a
cable television system.
(d) "Material" means any visual material shown on a cable television system, whether
or not accompanied by a sound track, or any sound recording played on a cable
television system.
(e) "Indecent material" shall mean material which is a representation or verbal
description of:
1. A human sexual or excretory organ or function; or
2. nudity; or
3. ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
4. masturbation;
which under contemporary community standards for cable television is patently
offensive.
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nance could withstand the various constitutional standards used to review
the regulation of obscene and indecent material.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR REGULATION OF OBSCENE AND
INDECENT MATERIAL
The first amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, or freedom of the
press."4 The rights embodied in this amendment are paramount to Ameri-
can constitutional law. Further, these rights are recognized as the founda-
tion of our democratic society. The purpose of the first amendment is to
"'preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail."85 The right of the public to receive access to social, political, moral
and other ideas underlies the provisions of the first amendment.56
Even though there is some authority for the proposition that first
amendment rights are more important than other constitutional rights or
guarantees, 7 the more generally accepted view is that all rights are on an
(f) "Community Standards" shall mean the standards of the community encompassed
within the territorial area covered by the franchise.
(g) "Provide" means to supply for use.
(h) "A person acts knowingly" if he has knowledge of the character or nature of the
material if he has actual notice of the nature of such material whether or not he has
precise notice of its contents.
Section 2
Violation of this statute shall constitute a misdemeanor and any person convicted of such
violation shall be confined in jail for not more than [ ] months or fined not more than
[ ] dollars, either or both.
Id.
The Model Ordinance is available upon request from Morality In Media, Inc., 475 Riverside
Drive, New York, New York, 10015.
54. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom speech;
or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievance." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Through the fourteenth amendment,
the principles inherent in the first amendment apply to state and local as well as federal levels
of government. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The fourteenth amendment
states in pertinent part that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
55. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
56. Id.
57. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (first amendment freedoms belong in
a preferred position); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (freedom of press and
speech occupy preferred position to property rights).
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equal footing.58 As a result, individuals may exercise their constitutional
rights only to the extent that such is consistent with the enjoyment of these
rights by all. 9 The government may regulate how people exercise their first
amendment guarantees in order to protect others' rights. Consequently, the
government may restrict some types of speech because they invade substan-
tial privacy interests in an intolerable manner or because they fail to con-
tribute in any meaningful way to an interchange of ideas.60 Types of speech
subject to restriction include defamation, 61 fighting words, 2 obscenity,13
and speech which incites others to imminent lawless conduct. 4 Yet, in their
attempt to regulate speech, opponents must consider and weigh the compet-
ing first amendment interests.
The right which most often conflicts with the ideology of the first
amendment is the right to privacy. The government may generally restrict
communication to protect unwilling people from exposure in the privacy of
their homes.6" In addition, state or local municipalities may protect the
right to privacy by passing legislation containing time, manner, and place
restrictions. 6 The first amendment, however, strictly limits governmental
authority to prohibit speech solely because the speech is offensive to some
viewers or listeners.6 7 These opposing principles illustrate that the conflict
between the first amendment rights of speakers and the privacy rights of
offended viewers and listeners is not easily resolved. In fact, it seems that
the medium of cable television has introduced a new constitutional di-
lemma, particularly since the subject matter at issue is only indecent and
58. Nebraska Press Ass'n. v, Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (asserting that authors
of Bill of Rights did not assign priorities).
59. Even the protection of the right to speak is subject to some limitation when it con-
flicts with a more important civil right. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 421.
60. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (for the proposition that the
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
crowded theater).
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official may
recover damages for defamation relating to official conduct only if it is proven statement was
made with actual malice).
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (New Jersey statute pun-
ishing speech which is likely to cause breach of peace in public place upheld).
63. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1969) (obscenity unprotected by first amendment because it lacks any redeeming social
value).
64. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (criminal syndicalism statute
must distinguish mere advocacy from incitement to imminent lawless action).
65. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (holding
that ancient concept that a man's home is his castle has lost none of its vitality).
66. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 538, 556 (1965)
(right of free speech does not mean a person may express opinions or beliefs to any group at
anytime at any public place).
67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
19861
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not obscene.68
The underlying presumption of the first amendment is that communi-
cation is protected from governmental interference.6 9 The judiciary has
identified neutrality toward those who communicate as a paramount obliga-
tion of the government.7 0 Consequently, government regulation of speech
varies according to the expressive potential of such speech.7 1 For example,
statutes which interfere with political speech are subject to strict scrutiny,
while commercial speech may be curtailed simply if the asserted govern-
ment interest is substantial and regulation is no more extensive than neces-
sary.72 Nowhere are these variable first amendment standards more appar-
ent than in the communications media.7 3 The government, for instance,
may regulate the content of broadcasting to a limited extent, but may not
similarly regulate newspapers.7 4 To deal with these many forms of commu-
nication, the Supreme Court has developed standards for reviewing govern-
ment regulations which affect the exercise of first amendment rights. One
such set of standards was developed to review the government's regulation
of obscene material.
Since government regulations have frequently sought to prohibit the
distribution of obscene material, the Supreme Court has faced this issue on
numerous occasions. 75 As the Supreme Court has held, any discussion of
68. Currently, the only material which can be constitutionally regulated on cable televi-
sion is that which rises to the level of obscenity. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 424.
69. Communication is speech or conduct which conveys ideas or consists of ideological
overtones. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581 (1978) (governmen-
tal action aimed at communicative impact is presumptively at odds with the first amendment).
70. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note I1, at 20 (there is a judicially recognized need for
neutrality by the government when it regulates communicative activities).
71. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (regulation of speech varies according to
its communicative potential).
72. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 100 S. Ct.
2343, 2350-54 (1980). In ruling unconstitutional the Public Service Commission's temporary
ban on all advertising by electric utilities, the Court held the regulation of commercial speech
(advertising) is subject to the following four-part analysis:
I. Is the expression protected?
2. Is the asserted governmental interest in regulation substantial?
3. Does the regulation directly advance the asserted governmental interest?
4. Is the regulation more extensive than necessary?
Id.
73. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 22-23 (communications media demands variable
regulatory standards).
74. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (upholding
right of access to broadcast media to reply to editorial attacks) with Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (denying similar right of access to print media).
75. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (to be obscene, material
taken as a whole must appeal to a prurient interest; depict in a patently offensive way sexual
conduct specifically defined by state law; and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (conviction of mailing obscene mate-
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obscenity must begin with a definition of the term.7 6 The current definition
and the accompanying standard is found in Miller v. California. Before
speech is considered obscene and thus unprotected under the Miller test, a
tribunal must find that:
a) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would perceive that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to a prurient interest;
b) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law;
c) the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.
7 8
Although these standards are very exacting, if material is found obscene
under Miller, it is not protected by the first amendment speech guarantee.
In addition, even if material is declared obscene under this test, pursuant to
Freedman v. Maryland, any regulatory scheme must provide the safeguard
of prompt judicial review of the determination.7 9 Effectively, Miller sug-
gests that only obscenity is regulable8 0 The permissible boundaries of state
regulation of offensive but non-obscene communication would seem to be
confined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning offensive
expression.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the first amendment
speech right of individuals over the temporary inconvenience to persons of-
fended by the expression."' For instance, in Cohen v. California,8" the
Court reversed the appellant's conviction under a California statute3 for
wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" inscribed on it. The
rial in violation of federal statute upheld).
76. To illustrate the Supreme Court's difficulty defining the term "obscene," see L.
TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-16 at 656-670.
77. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (conviction under California statute for knowingly distributing
obscene material to unwilling recipients vacated and remanded).
78. Id. at 24.
79, A prompt and final judicial determination as to some material's obscenity must be
assured to check the unbridled discretion of an administrative agency. 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965)
(conviction reversed for violation of Maryland statute requiring board's approval before films
can be shown).
80. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (conviction for showing the
film "Carnal Knowledge" notwithstanding scenes of nudity reversed).
81. See Note, supra note 7, at 989 (state has no right to cleanse public debate to point
where its palatable to the most sensitive individuals).
82. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970), repealed by Act of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1263,
1974 Cal. Stat. 2742 (in pertinent part statute prohibited individuals from maliciously and
willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct).
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Court rejected the proposition that mere offensive langauge, which does not
rise to the level of obscenity, could be proscribed in a manner consistent
with the first amendment.84 Additionally, the Court held that before the
public expression of ideas could be restricted, the state must show that an
invasion of substantial privacy interests occurred in an essentially intolera-
ble manner. 85 The majority believed that in Cohen's instance those offended
by his message had a duty to avert their eyes since they were outside the
sanctuary of their homes. 86 In the Court's eyes, there had been no invasion
of substantial privacy interests. As a result, Cohen's freedom of speech out-
weighed any burden put on those who were compelled to turn away from
expression they considered offensive.8 7
Thus, Cohen seems to represent one boundary of impermissible state
regulation of offensive speech. States can proscribe offensive material which
rises to the level of obscenity. Regulation of anything less, merely because it
may offend an unwilling viewer who could easily avoid sustaining injury,
would be unconstitutional.88 These confines appeared to be well-defined un-
til 1978 when, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,8 the Supreme Court de-
parted from the first amendment precedent set in Cohen.
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC regulation of "inde-
cent" speech, at least in the area of broadcasting. In this case, a New York
radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation broadcast a monologue by co-
median George Carlin which contained several indecent words. A listener
complained to the FCC which issued a declaratory order finding the mono-
logue indecent as broadcast and therefore subject to regulation." Having
experienced definitional problems with obscenity previously,91 the Court de-
fined the term "indecent speech" for the first time. According to the Court,
indecent speech is expression which, although it may have social, political,
or artistic value, fails to conform to accepted standards of morality. 92 The
Court concluded that the obscenity standards developed for print media
might not afford enough latitude to regulators of the electronic media. The
Court found broadcasting to be uniquely pervasive in its extension into the
84. 403 U.S. at 25 (mere offensive but not obscene language is protected by first
amendment).
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 24-26.
88. The first amendment rights of a speaker outweigh the privacy rights of the listener
where the listener is outside his home and can easily avoid injury by turning away. Cohen, 403
U.S. 15.
89. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (first case where FCC gained authority to regulate content of
broadcast).
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
92. 438 U.S. at 739-41.
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privacy of the home and to be readily accessible to children." Furthermore,
the Court upheld the FCC's regulatory power over indecency in light of
broadcasting's unique characteristics of pervasiveness and accessibility. 94
Thus, these unique characteristics are of paramount importance when for-
mulating a regulatory schemeY.
Essentially, the Pacifica decision represents a "time, manner, and
place" restriction on broadcast communication. This case simply states that
certain types of programming may be acceptable at certain times of the day
but not at others because of the pervasiveness of the broadcast medium. To
date, Pacifica is the only decision permitting the regulation of indecent ex-
pression in any forum. A prudent reading of Pacifica illustrates that the
characteristics of the mode of distribution are central to determining the
constitutional parameters for authority to prohibit indecent material." As a
result, it would appear that the permissible extent of government regulation
depends upon how cable television is characterized.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF CABLE TELEVISION: BROADCAST OR
ELECTRONIC NEWSPRINT?
The wide variety of services that cable provides creates difficulties for a
regulator both in characterizing cable television and in formulating consti-
tutional regulations. 7 This characterization is critical to the determination
of state power to regulate indecent programming on cable television." To
regulate cable as it does broadcast, the state must show that the unique
characteristics of the cable medium compel application of the same strict
standards imposed on the broadcast media.99 Courts have historically cre-
ated pecking orders of first amendment rights, shuffling the priorities of
these rights in different media settings.'00 While it is true that the public's
93. Id. at 748.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 728-50.
97. For example, the same cable operator can be considered a public utility while car-
rying major network broadcast; acting as a broadcaster when it originates its own programs;
and be a common carrier when it rents its equipment to public. See Recht, Cable Television in
Illinois: The Problems of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 50 CH.-]KENT L. REV. 119, 121 (1973).
98. Whether cable television is treated as a broadcasting medium or electronic newspa-
per will affect the permissible scope of regulation. See Hofbauer, supra note 11, at 154.
99. See Note, supra note 12, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 259 for the proposition that
states must show cable's unique characteristics require the same regulatory standards as
broadcast.
100. Lively & Leahy, Government and the Media: Regulating A First Amendment
Value System, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 913, 916 (1978-79) (different communication mediums
require different first amendment standards with the print media receiving the greatest protec-
tion and broadcast receiving the least).
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right to be informed is paramount in an electronic forum, 10 1. editorial dis-
cretion reigns supreme in the print media.102
The characterization of cablecast determines the permissible extent of
any regulatory effort.' As a result, proponents of cable TV regulation
analogize the medium to broadcast, while opponents liken the medium to
the print media. Justice White laid the foundation for both analogies when
he observed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC °M that various mediums
of communication require different regulatory standards. Justice White
concluded that the differences between cablecast and other communication
forums justify differing first amendment standards. 03
Since the newspaper analogy, like any analogy, depends upon a com-
parison of specific aspects unique to both mediums,106 some of cable televi-
sion's most functional characteristics are overlooked. For instance, cable is
uniquely capable of absorbing rapid technological change. 107 Although
other mediums have benefitted from recent changes in technology, none
have benefitted nearly as extensively as the cable medium. 108 Additionally,
since cable is restricted to those viewers who are willing to pay for it, cable
programming, like newspapers, can only enter the privacy of the home by
the owner's consent. 109 Choice, as a result, is a major factor with cablecast.
A consideration of these similarities illustrates that cable television is, in
fact, more analogous to the print media than broadcast.
Judicially, the trend has been to dismiss analogies between cablecast
and broadcast. In Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City,"1 0 for
101. Id., citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
102. Id., citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
104. J. White's majority opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
(Court upheld FCC orders requiring radio station to offer free broadcasting time to opponents
of political candidates or views endorsed by station and to any person who has been personally
attacked in course of a broadcast).
105. Id.
106. The facts which are analogized must be sufficiently similar so as to make the anal-
ogy result in a logical conclusion. See, e.g., G. SHAPIRO, supra note 1I, at 4.
107. The minimal cost of cable installation allows new systems to be installed, or old
systems updated, as fast as the new technology is available. In fact, cable may actually be
leading these new technological advancements since it is part of the telecommunications
market.
108. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 4 (cable television has been transformed from a
medium used solely to retransmit broadcast signals to a medium concerned with providing
programming for hundreds of channels).
109. See Riggs, supra note 12, at 300 for proposition that cable can only enter the
viewer's home through the owner's consent.
110. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982) (Roy City's prohibition of indecency on cable
TV unconstitutional because it was based on the premise that city could impose restrictions on
cable content to improve morals, protect children, control streets and to franchise and license).
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example, the district court for the Northern District of Utah held that the
essential differences between both mediums invalidated Roy City's ordi-
nance."' In Roy City, the city attempted to regulate indecent programming
on cable TV, claiming that it was justifiably exercising control over con-
Id. at 1166.
Ill. Id. at 1166 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-4,-8,-l1,-41,-80 (1973); UTAH
CONST. art. Xl, § 5). Roy City's ordinance was enacted pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
10-1229 (Supp. 1981). The full. text of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229 (Supp. 1981) provides:
(I) No person, including franchisee, shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable any
pornographic or indecent materials to its subscribers.
(2) For purposes of this section "material" means any visual display shown on a cable
television system, whether or not accompanied by sound, or any sound recording
played on a cable television system.
(3) For the purposes of this section "pornographic material" is any material defined as
pornographic in sections 76-10-1201 and 76-10-1203.
(4) For the purposes of this section "indecent material" means any material described
in section 76-10-1227.
(5) For the purposes of this section "distribute" means to send, transmit, retransmit, or
otherwise pass through a cable television system.
(6) Prosecution for violation of this section may be initiated at the instance of the
attorney general or any county or city attorney of an interested political subdivision
or at the instance of the governing body of any such political subdivision.
(7) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Id.
Additionally, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1203 (1978) defines "pornography" as any material
if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds that,
taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(b) It is patently offensive in the description or depiction of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, or excretion; and
(c) Taken as a whole it does not have serious literary, artist, political or scientific
value.
Id.
Finally, "indecent material" is defined by UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1227 (Supp. 1981) as
follows:
(I)- "Description or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" means:
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, or
female breast.
(2) "Nude or partially denuded figures" means:
(a) Less than completely and opaquely covered:
(i) Human genitals;
(ii) Pubic regions;
(iii) Buttock; and
(iv) Female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola;
and
(b) Human Male genitals in a discernibly turgid state even if completely and
opaquely covered.
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tent. 1 12 According to the city this power of content control was an inherent
part of its power to improve community morals and to care for children. 1
To support its argument, the city anolgized its power to the power vested in
the FCC to regulate broadcast content." 4
The Roy City court disagreed with the city and ruled that choice was
the crucial factor distinguishing communication by cable from communica-
tion by broadcast. 18 The elements of this choice can be encountered at va-
rying levels: (1) the choice of whether or not to subscribe to cable; (2) the
choice to cancel the subscription at any time; and (3) the choice to
purchase any of a wide variety of offered services. 16 In addition, the court
recognized the following differences:
CABLE
1. User needs to subscribe.
2. User holds power to
cancel subscriptions.
3. Limited Advertising.
4. Transmittal through
wires.
5. Reception via private
cable.
6. User pays a fee.
7. User receives preview of
coming attractions.
8. Distributor or distributee
may add services, signals
or choices.
BROADCAST
1. User need not subscribe.
2. User has no power to
cancel. May only
complain to F.C.C.,
station, network, or
sponsor.
3. Extensive advertising.
4. Transmittal through
public airwaves.
5. Reception appropriated
from public airwaves.
6. User does not pay a fee.
7. User receives listing in
public press or
commercial guides.
8. Neither distributor or
distributee may add
services, signals or
choices.11
7
A review of these differences illustrates that there is in fact little similarity
at all between the cablecast and broadcast media. However, such differ-
ences do not prevent proponents of cable TV regulation from attempting to
use the Pacifica rationale as support.
Advocates of regulation of indecency on cable television contend that
555 F. Supp. at 1165-66.
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1166-67.
Id. at 1168.
Robbins, supra note 4, at 435.
555 F. Supp. at 1167.
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cable is similar to broadcast because both are uniquely pervasive in their
extension into the privacy of the home and both are readily accessible to
children.118 This right to privacy is what the Pacifica court sought to pro-
tect.11 9 Essentially, proponents of this viewpoint argue that Pacifica's "in-
trusiveness"' 20 theory, which justifies regulation of broadcast to protect un-
consenting adults and impressionable children, logically extends to
regulation of indecent material on cablecast. 12 Such proponents support
this contention with three principle arguments.
First, cable television is no less pervasive than broadcast simply be-
cause its programming is transmitted over cable lines rather than the air-
waves. " ' As statistics show, cable is quickly establishing itself in a large
number of American households.1 2 3 For the viewer, the reception of cable
into the home comes via his television set, electronic equipment almost all
homes possess. Drawn to their logical conclusion by proponents of regula-
tion, these facts indicate that viewers are entitled to the same protection
from indecent cablecasts as from indecent broadcasts.' 8 ' This conclusion
follows from the fact that offensive material can be seen or heard by uncon-
senting viewers regardless of the nature of the communications medium.1 2 6
Second, since cable is presented in the home like radio and television
programming, cable is subject to greater restrictions than other communi-
cation occurring outside the home.' 2 The rationale behind greater restric-
tions is that the viewer is a captive audience inside the home and thus, the
first amendment tips in favor of the right to privacy. 2 7 When a viewer
turns on cable programming, he is as equally captive to what the cable
operators present as he is to the material that radio broadcasters present.
This being the case, proponents of regulation contend that an unwilling
viewer would be unable to avoid assault from an indecent cablecast. In
118. If it can be shown that cable television is uniquely pervasive into the home and
uniquely accessible to children, the rationale for regulating broadcast would likewise apply to
regulate cablecast. See Note, supra note 99, at 259.
119. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726-48 (individuals should not be forced to
listen to offensive broadcasting in privacy of their home).
120. Pacifica's "intrusiveness" theory deems broadcast to be pervasive since it invades
the privacy of the home without warning.
121. See Krattenmaker, supra note 12, at 624 for proposition that Pacifica's rationale
logically extends to regulation of indecent material on cable television.
122. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (FCC may regulate cable as
broadcasters, but not as common carriers). Id. at 699-704.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
124. Krattenmaker, supra note 12, at 622.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 623.
127. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (city policy
banning political advertisements on city buses upheld while permitting advertisements of other
types).
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one's home, "the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
first amendment rights of an intruder."'28
Third, cable television is as easily accessible to unsupervised children
in the home as is radio '2 This is an important element of the pervasiveness
theory of Pacifica. °30 When minors are likely to be in the viewing audience
the state has a substantial interest in regulating indecent programming to
protect their well-being. 13' Since cable appears as accessible to children as
broadcast, and is potentially more harmful because of cable's visual compo-
nent, 32 the permissible state interests described in Pacifica" s likewise jus-
tify the regulation of indecent cable programming.
Advocates of the regulation of indecency on cable television base their
arguments on the belief that cable is just as pervasive as broadcast. Yet
cable's pervasive impact demonstrates its importance as a source of free
expression. Due to this potential for free expression, champions for cable's
cause contend that governmental interference should be limited. After all,
pervasiveness has never justified governmental regulation of the editorial
content of a newspaper in a one newspaper town. 34
First amendment activists and representatives of the cable industry ar-
gue that for constitutional purposes, cable television should be compared to
a newspaper "5 and thus afforded more liberal freedom of speech.' 36 In sum,
opponents of cable TV regulation maintain that Pacifica is only a limited
exception to the general standards established in Miller. Since cable is
analogous to the newsprint media, these opponents argue that the latter rule
applies.18 7 In support of this analogy, representatives of the cable industry
128. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; see also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397
U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (individual's right to be left alone in his own home upheld).
129. Children can as easily tune in to indecent cablecasts as they can tune in to indecent
broadcasts. Krattenmaker, supra note 12, at 623.
130. 438 U.S. at 749 (accessibility to unsupervised children is legitimate government
concern).
131. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (conviction for selling magazines
to children which were obscene to them but not adults was upheld because children are a
group which government has a significant interest in protecting).
132. Cable's visual component is more harmful to viewers than radio's audio component
is to listeners because without paying close attention, the cable viewer may be momentarily
injured by the flash of any indecent programming.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
134. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-56.
135. Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and The
First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577 (1981) (earliest use of cable television-newspaper
analogy came from Sloan Commission supra note 24, at 42-46).
136. Traditionally, the newsprint media has been afforded extensive protection of free-
dom of speech. If cable television is shown to be analogous to newsprint, the same protection
should be afforded both mediums of communication. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 3-4.
137. See Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 689 (likening cable television to "private elec-
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point out three similar characteristics.
Primarily, opponents of regulation argue that cable TV operators, like
newspaper editors, originate some of the expression communicated over
their system."" Cable programmers must exercise editorial control and
judgment in selecting programs for their channels since these systems typi-
cally offer several channels which appeal to a variety of audiences, Like-
wise, newspaper publishers must use their editorial control and judgment to
determine what material to print in their publication. 13 9 Typically, both me-
diums of communication offer sections or channels devoted to entertain-
ment, sports, weather, and local, national, and international news. Oppo-
nents of regulation argue that just as the editorial functions performed by
cable operators and newspaper publishers are indistinguishable, so, too, are
the expressions from which each have to choose.
Additionally, a cable system's content is limited in channel capacity
only by the investment made by the system's owner since there are no abso-
lute physical limitations governing its size. 40 Similarly, a newspaper's con-
tent is limited only by what its publisher decides to print; physically the
paper can include as much or as little information as the publisher desires.
Because the scope of permissible government regulation is premised on
physical limitations 141 and since neither the print nor the cable media suffer
from these confines,"42 the same first amendment standards applicable to
restrictions on the content of print media should be applied to cable as well.
Finally, cable programming, whether indecent or otherwise, does not
intrude into the privacy of the home unless the viewer chooses to subscribe
to the service."" Cable subscribers receive programming only by voluntarily
entering into a subscription agreement under which their television set is
connected to the cable system. Moreover, the material at which cable inde-
cency regulations are directed is found on special access channels which
require the subscriber to pay a fee additional to the basic rate."'4 In like
manner, newspapers usually do not come into one's home unless she sub-
scribes to the publication or buys it at a newsstand and brings it home.
tronic publication" Court found no constitutional distinction between cable and newspapers).
138. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note I1, at 3-4 (cable operators produce their own pro-
gramming; newspaper editors write their own columns).
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
141. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 376-77 for proposition that scope of per-
missible government regulations is premised on physical limitations of the medium.
142. The scarcity theory does not apply to cable television because cable is a medium of
abundance. Comment, supra note 8, at 824.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
144. Id.; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210 n.6 (that a commercial enterprise directs
programming only to paying customers presumably establishes that those customers are
neither unwilling viewers nor offended).
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Neither the cable patron nor the newspaper customer can advance claims of
intrusion since each voluntarily brought the material into the home. As a
result, if the individual is concerned about the presence of offensive mate-
rial in the home, she may decline to purchase the services or cancel her
subscription. 1 5 An examination of indecent programming in light of the
aforementioned arguments follows to determine if the current regulation of
indecency on cable TV survives constitutional scrutiny.
V. INDECENT PROGRAMMING ON CABLE TELEVISION
The current controversy surrounding the regulation of cable television
concerns the government's authority to restrict indecent, but not obscene,
programming. Because the first amendment does not protect obscenity in
any form, or in any medium of expression, 1" material which rises to the
level of obscenity is not protected on cable. However, despite its offensive-
ness to some, indecent speech is protected by the first amendment because
it does not rise to the level of obscenity. 147 Additionally, since the regulation
of any form of expression is inherently dangerous to promoting a market-
place of ideas, legislation curtailing expression must be carefully and nar-
rowly drawn. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court in Pacifica sought to
define indecency so men of common intelligence would understand what
material is and is not prohibited.' 8 In Pacifica, the Court cited the follow-
ing definition from Webster's Dictionary:
INDECENCY. a: Altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the na-
ture of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or
expected or appropriate: hardly suitable . . . b: not conforming
to [the] generally accepted standards of morality .... "0
The Court then found this definition unclear as applied to the broadcast
context, so it clarified this definition, holding indecent speech to be expres-
sion which, although it has social, political, or artistic value,'3 0 fails to con-
145. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 44 for proposition that individuals concerned
about offensive programming entering their home can decline to subscribe to the channels they
find indecent.
146. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not protected by the
Constitution no matter what the medium).
147. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
148. If men of common intelligence cannot understand what activity is prohibited by a
statute or regulations, the law is unconstitutional as being "vague." A fundamental require-
ment of the first amendment is that people are aware of what activity is prohibited. See gener-
ally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 730-38 (1980).
149. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) as cited in Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 740 n.14.
150. These forms of expression are generally protected by the first amendment. See gen-
erally Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
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form to accepted standards of morality."'
Regardless of how it is defined, indecency is nevertheless protected
speech,'" as the Supreme Court's indecency and obscenity opinions indi-
cate. One needs only to read the Court's opinion in Miller for a case-in-
point. In Miller, the Court carefully distinguished obscenity, which is not
considered protected speech, from indecency. 53 This meticulousness in dis-
tinction supports the contention by critics of cable television regulation that
the Pacifica decision is actually inapplicable in the cable context. Absolute
proscriptions based on an absolute definition of indecency, however, ignore
the narrow fact-specific holding of the Pacifica Court. 5 4
In the cable television medium, Pacifica has little application because
it only states that broadcast indecency may be channeled with reasonable
time, manner, and place regulations. 5 5 In fact, the Court itself emphasized
the narrowness of its holding, 15" even within the broadcast medium, and
noted that the differences between radio and cablecast may also be relevant
to the formulation of any regulations. 57 In his Pacifica dissent, Justice
Brennan even argued that the majority's decision violated the first amend-
ment rights of the broadcast media and the people who want to hear such
broadcasts.' 58 Justice Brennan's contention was based on the fact that
Pacifica restricted the transmission and reception of material which did not
rise to the level of obscenity.' 5 9
When applied to cablecast, Justice Brennan's dissent in Pacifica is ac-
tually more convincing than when applied to broadcast. First, it is the sub-
scriber who chooses to allow the programming into the home. The right to
privacy can be protected, therefore, by either not subscribing to that partic-
151. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41.
152. See McFadden, supra note 1I, at 338 (since indecency does not rise to the level of
obscenity it is protected speech).
153. Miller, 413 U.S. 23-26.
154. Pacifica does not stand for proposition that indecency has no first amendment pro-
tection. Indecency is not a fixed concept and is, instead, a variable concept depending on the
composition of the audience and time of programming. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 437.
155. 438 U.S. at 750; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (states may pass reasonable
time, manner, place regulations to protect individual privacy).
156. See also Bolger v. Young Drugs Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (special
interest of federal government in regulation of broadcast does not translate into a justification
for regulation of other means of communication); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term; For-
ward: Freedom of Expression In The Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1980) for proposi-
tion that Pacifica may come to be viewed ,as a "narrow, highly particular decision pushing a
number of doctrinal exceptions to first amendment principles to their limits because the excep-
tions conjoin." Id. at 45.
157. 438 U.S. at 750.
158. 438 U.S. at 762, 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
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ular channel or by turning off any programming found offensive.' 60 Conse-
quently, ascribing an intrusive nature to broadcasting fails to recognize the
ease with which an individual can turn off his television set. Even though
viewers may be momentarily offended by unexpected program content, such
a fleeting annoyance does not justify complete suppression of the speech
involved. 6 ' In fact, the judiciary has long recognized that individuals of-
fended by indecent material have a duty to avert their eyes rather than rely
upon the government to suppress the offensive discourse.6 2
Second, government's ability, pursuant to the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is dependent upon a show-
ing that substantial individual privacy interests are being invaded in an es-
sentially intolerable manner.' 63 In the case of an individual who voluntarily
allows indecent programming into his home, no intolerable invasion of pri-
vacy is present since an instance of exposure to offensive material "is a fact
of social existence and is a small price to pay for the value of free expres-
sion.' 164 Additionally, broadcast guides and movie reviews provide sufficient
notice of upcoming programming to alert extremely sensitive individuals to
potentially offensive material. When the limited privacy invasion is weighed
against the decreased freedom of expression resulting from governmental
restrictions on non-obscene cablecasts that others may wish to view, the cost
of limiting these privacy expectations hardly seems substantial.'
Third, as applied to cable television, the rationale of regulating inde-
cent broadcasts to protect young children is overbroad'66 because it restricts
the viewing of such material in homes that have no children. Many homes
that subscribe to cable TV have no children and as the Supreme Court held
160. See Note, supra note 7, 984 (since individual permits broadcast into his home he
can protect his right to privacy by turning off the discourse which he finds offensive); see also
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. See generally Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (fleeting exposure to offensive material creates
no lasting injuries since individual is free to turi away).
162. Id. at 21; see also Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61 (reaffirming Cohen); but cf. Pacifica 438
U.S. 760 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (to avoid further offense by turning off the radio is like
being forced to run away from an assault after the first blow).
163. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
164. See Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words," The First Amendment
and the Broadcast Media, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 164, 174-75 (1978) for proposition that when
an individual voluntarily allows indecent programming into the home there is no intolerable
invasion of privacy.
165. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note !1, at 35 (cost of limiting privacy interest hardly
seems high when individuals control what programs are seen or heard in the home).
166. An "overbroad" regulation reaches constitutionally protected activity. When such
restricts the constitutional rights of expression, government bears the burden of proving there
are no less restrictive alternatives. Thus, the government, not the cable companies, should con-
sider alternative measures to protect children. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 917-18 (1970).
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in Butler v. Michigan,. the government cannot ban non-obscene program-
ming reaching childless homes. 6 7 Even in those homes that do have chil-
dren, parents may limit the cable channels to which they subscribe or re-
strict the programs available to their children if the material is
objectionable. Thus, cable TV enables individuals to choose what they wish
to view without intruding on the sensibilities of others. Governmental regu-
lation of this choice, which occurs in the privacy of the home, represents
control of individual moral decisions. Regulation of this nature departs
from first amendment precedent.' "
Any attempt to restrict the showing of indecency on cable television
must consider the first amendment interests affected. In this context, the
relevant interests concern freedom to receive expression and the privacy
rights of viewers or listeners. Representatives of the cable industry contend
that because the viewer's interest arguably includes the speaker's interest,
the former is entitled to substantial protection. 6 9 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the potential presence of unwitting viewers does not
automatically justify curtailing all speech capable of being offensive. °7 0 The
right of free speech does not embrace a right to cancel out the speech of
others.' 7 ' Finally, although courts recognize that viewers are entitled to re-
ceive desired programming,17 2 any regulation of cablecast content protects
only those who are offended by the material while ignoring the rights of
those who want to receive such programming. 1 73 Implicit in the first amend-
ment is not only the right to transmit ideas, but also the right to receive
them, especially in the privacy of one's home.
74
The right to privacy includes the right to personal autonomy.' 75 The
167. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (government should not "reduce the adult population
• . . to reading only what is fit for children"); see also Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61.
168. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1970) (rejected as totally inconsistent with
philosophy of the first amendment the concept that there is a compelling state interest in con-
trolling the moral content of a person's thoughts). Id. at 565-66.
169. "The viewer who wishes to receive communications has the broadest first amend-
ment interest because not only does it include the interest in receiving what the operator
chooses to [send], but it also encompasses an interest in any messages access-seekers wish to
transmit." Hofbauer, supra note 11, at 150.
170. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (conviction for improperly using
American flag overruled).
171. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
172. Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (responsible members of listening community entitled to present evidence to FCC
regarding programming practices).
173. Note, supra note 7, at 988.
174. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 390 for proposition that the right to re-
ceive ideas is implicit in the first amendment.
175. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (no substantial government interest in regulating
private possession of pornographic materials by adults); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (established fundamental constitutional right of privacy in one's own home).
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Supreme Court extended this fundamental right to allow the viewing of
pornography in one's own home." 6 Clearly, this personal autonomy permits
an individual to bring indecent material into his home through cable televi-
sion. The current regulations on cable programming, however, do not allow
this and thereby infringe on the viewer's right to privately receive informa-
tion within the confines of his home.'7 7 Thus, this regulation undermines
one of the basic beliefs upon which the first amendment is premised: gov-
ernment should allow a wide range of discussion, letting the individual be
free to choose those viewpoints by which he is persuaded.
In his dissent in Pacifica, Justice Brennan expressed concern over the
lack of clear standards for the FCC to use when formulating regulations of
obscene or indecent cable communications. 78 More important is whether
the Supreme Court should have left this decision to the FCC at all when
procedural safeguards were lacking to insure that protected speech was not
unconstitutionally abridged. A precisely defined test against which to judge
questionable material diminishes the danger of infringement on the consti-
tutional rights of the cable operator and viewer alike.'7 9
. Primarily, the establishment of precise standards would lead to the de-
velopment of more consistent and rational criteria. For example, technical
factors such as determining when most children are absent from the audi-
ence to permit programming of "adult" material and at what age children
should be protected, could be more efficiently ascertained in a rulemaking
rather than a judicial setting.' 80 Furthermore, administrative agencies like
the FCC are less than ideal forums for the determination of constitutional
rights since in these agencies, decisions are made by political appointees
with terms of limited duration.' 8' In sum, all these inherent dangers to the
first amendment rights of cable television viewers disclose the weaknesses in
the present trend to proceed on a case-by-case determination of whether
offensive programming can be shown on cable television. A solution to this
standardless quagmire may, however, be attainable.
176. Id.
177. Current cable regulations forbid the reception of pornographic programming in the
privacy of the home. See Note, supra note 7, at 990.
178. 438 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Such a precise test would tell the operator exactly what type of expression is pro-
hibited and what type may be transmitted to the viewer. See Wing, Morality and Broadcast-
ing: FCC Control of "Indecent" Material Following Pacifica, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 145, 172
(1979).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 171.
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VI. CONTEXTUAL REGULATION: A HAPPY MEDIUM FOR CABLE
TELEVISION
The current ad hoc regulation of cable communications has resulted in
confusion for the cable industry. Cablecasters fear programming indecent,
but not obscene, material due to the standards originally developed for the
broadcast medium in Pacifica. The result is a "chilling effect" on protected
speech.182 Therefore, a uniform approach must be developed which fairly
balances the conflicting right to privacy and the protected speech interests
at stake. The question we must now answer is whether the umbrella of the
first amendment protects everyone, or has it sprung a leak where cable tele-
vision is concerned?
Based on decisions in other media contexts, it is almost certain that
indecent programming on cable television can constitutionally be regu-
lated.183 However, the rules must be narrowly drawn to support the sub-
stantial governmental interests in protecting the welfare of children and the
privacy of the homes.' 8' Pacifica does not necessarily establish the regula-
tory standards for cable television since the Court itself recognized that va-
rious mediums require different standards.18 Moreover, since cable has sev-
eral manageable variables'86  while broadcast has only one, 187  the
constitutional problems raised by the regulation of cable TV are more man-
ageable than those associated with indecency on broadcast. 88 Not only do
recent judicial decisions support the manipulation of these variables to reg-
ulate cable communications contextually, 189 but Congress also espouses con-
textual regulation in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.190
182. This chilling effect occurs when a person does not know exactly what activity a
statute prohibits. Consequently, people forego constitutionally protected activity for fear of
violating the statute. See generally LOCKHART, supra note 148, at 730-38.
183. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 367.
184. Riggs, Regulation of Indecency On Cable Television, 59 FLA. B.J. 9, 12 (1985) for
proposition that regulation of cable television content must be narrowly drawn to protect these
interests.
185. 438 U.S. at 748.
186. With cablecast, the operator can segregate programming, introduce variable time
programming, use addressable converters, unscrambling devices, and offer tiered services.
187. The only effective manageable variable for radio broadcasting is the time variable.
See Riggs, supra note 12, at 326.
188. For example, because of cable's ability to segregate programming, cable operators
could separate programming based on content. Cable operators could offer a basic package
free of any potentially offensive material and an advanced package which contained sexually
explicit material. By requiring subscribers to pay an additional fee for the advanced package,
those who did not want to view offensive programming would not have to subscribe to this
package.
189. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
190. 47 U.S.C.S. § 521 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
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Any regulation which is premised on the context of the speech is obvi-
ously content based. However, where the regulation, though content-related,
is directed at subject matter rather than point of view, the regulation is
more constitutionally palatable. 9 1 Consequently, a court may use a less ex-
acting standard. 9 In fact, content based regulations premised on separa-
tion of programming are permitted under the Court's reasoning in Young v.
American Mini Theaters'" since the regulation is not aimed at suppressing
expression, but merely channeling it to those who wish to receive it. This
potential to separate programming is what makes the cable medium regul-
able while still respecting others' privacy interests and protecting children
from harmful exposure to indecent material. Specifically, this potential to
separate cable programming allows for regulation at both the point of sale
and the point of reception.
Initially, the point of sale provides the best opportunity to effectively
control the distribution of cable programming. For example, cable operators
could be required to offer tiered-service programming to insure that poten-
tially offensive materials are received only by consenting adults. Such a ser-
vice would provide a basic package to all subscribers that contained little or
no potentially offensive programming. In additional packages, the cable op-
erator could offer entertainment which included sexually explicit material.
These additional programs would require the subscriber to pay an increased
fee so the person would be receiving only those channels for which he paid.
With these pay channels, the government and the cable operator alike
would have some assurance that potentially offensive material would be re-
ceived only in those homes that desire the service. If the consumer did not
want to view erotic or indecent programming, she could restrict her sub-
scription to the basic package.
Next, the subscriber could control the viewing of the channels received
at the point of reception, that is, the home. Section 624 of the Policy Act
espouses this method of regulation.' 94 In Section 624(d)(2)(a) the Policy
Act requires cable operators to offer "lockboxes," for sale or lease, upon
request so that the viewing of any given channel at any given time could be
restricted.19 5 This device permits concerned parents to control their chil-
& AD. NEws 4655.
191. This is because the underlying theme of the first amendment is that speech should
not be suppressed merely because it espouses an unfavorable point of view.
192. Id.
193. 427 U.S. at 50.
194. In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent, §
624(d)(2)(a) provides that "upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall provide
(by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable
service during periods selected by that subscriber." Policy Act, supra note 10, at § 624
(d)(2)(a).
195. Id.
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dren's access to offensive programming. Thus, a lockbox or similar device
would allow parents to protect their children from viewing the adult chan-
nels obtained under the tiered service programming. 96 Additional control-
ling devices which would be effective at the point of reception are advance
notices of erotic programming and published program guides. These would
forewarn parents so the lockboxes could be used effectively.
When regulation at the point of sale is combined with restrictions at
the point of reception, the opportunities for offending unconsenting adults
or adversely affecting children are reduced to a minimum. Moreover, such
contextual regulation respects the first amendment rights of adults who de-
sire to view sexually explicit or erotic material. This type of programming
may nevertheless be obtained by adults who pay the additional monthly
charge. Still, for the regulation to be constitutionally complete, even if it
only restricts the time, manner, or place of expression, there must be a
specific definition of what is regulable'97 as well as procedural safeguards
open to those desiring a review of this determination.19 8
An appropriately narrow definition of indecency would have to include
the Miller standards' 99 modified to include those acts deemed indecent but
not obscene. To achieve this definition, a statute should judge material
against its potential harm to minors while not necessarily requiring the pro-
gramming to be deemed appealing to a "prurient interest." Pacifica would
support this type of statute since the Court there upheld the FCC's power
to regulate material that was not erotic. 00 Above all, such a definition
would still permit the government to regulate cablecast to advance its sub-
stantial interest in the welfare of children.
Any specific definition would also have to incorporate the procedural
safeguards set forth in Freedman v. Maryland0' since the statute would
arguably be aimed at the suppression of expression. The Supreme Court
held in Freedman that all such regulatory schemes must contain the safe-
guard of prompt judicial review of whether the expression in question may
be constitutionally prohibited. 20 1 Therefore, after the local governmental
agency established a specific and narrow definition of indecency, for the law
to pass constitutional muster, the cable operator must be given a chance to
196. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (Miami, Florida ordinance
regulating cable distribution of indecent material found unconstitutional).
197. See Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (requiring specific definition of obscenity before regula-
tions could be devised).
198. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring the procedural safe-
guard of prompt judicial review for regulations which suppress expression).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 77 and 78.
200. 438 U.S. at 726.
201. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
202. Id. at 52.
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obtain a judicial determination of whether the material prohibited actually
falls within this definition. This shield would protect the cablecaster from
decisions of local agencies which possess unbridled discretion to determine
whether the programming conforms to the legal standards.
While this approach would not eliminate indecency on cable television,
it would limit the availability of potentially offensive programming by pro-
viding a system in which the viewer receives only that to which he sub-
scribes and nothing more. Additionally, once cable programming is received
into the home, this statutory scheme would assist parents by allowing them
to utilize a lockbox by which to control their children's viewing. Therefore,
this approach would protect the substantial government interests in the per-
sonal right to privacy and the protection of minors without forcing con-
senting adults to forego viewing sexually explicit or erotic programming in
the privacy of their home.
VII. CONCLUSION
This note has drawn together the relevant bodies of precedent and de-
veloped a scheme whereby the regulation of indecent programming on cable
television would be constitutionally acceptable. The Supreme Court has fre-
quently stated that each medium of communication is unique. The rationale
for regulating one medium may be inapplicable to another and cable televi-
sion is no exception to this rule. It is improbable that any regulatory
scheme would completely satisfy all concerned parties. However, if a con-
textual regulatory scheme was adopted, the constitutional guarantees of the
cable operator, viewer, and unconsenting subscriber would be fairly and ad-
equately balanced. Regardless of the type of regulation, a uniform approach
is needed to end the chilling effect put on cable operators and allow cable
patrons to receive the programming that they desire.
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